3
Of
Mixed Monarchies
But
it is in the new monarchy that difficulties really exist. First, if it is
not entirely new, but a member as it were of a mixed state, its disorders
spring at first from a natural difficulty which exists in all new
dominions, because men change masters willingly, hoping to better
themselves; and this belief makes them take arms against their rulers, in
which they are deceived, as experience later proves that they have gone
from bad to worse. This is the result of another very natural cause, which
is the inevitable harm inflicted on those over whom the prince obtains
dominion, both by his soldiers and by an infinite number of other injuries
caused by his occupation.
Thus
you find enemies in all those whom you have injured by occupying that
dominion, and you cannot maintain the friendship of those who have helped
you to obtain this possession, as you will not be able to fulfill their
expectations, nor can you use strong measures with them, being under an
obligation to them; for which reason, however strong your armies may be,
you will always need the favour of the inhabitants to take possession of a
province. It was from these causes that Louis XII of France, though able
to occupy Milan without trouble, immediately lost it, and the forces of
Ludovico alone were sufficient to take it from him the first time, for the
inhabitants who had willingly opened their gates to him, finding
themselves deluded in the hopes they had cherished and not obtaining those
benefits they had anticipated, could not bear the vexatious rule of their
new prince.
It
is indeed true that, after reconquering rebel territories they are not so
easily lost again, for the ruler is now, by the fact of the rebellion,
less averse to secure his position by punishing offenders, unmasking
suspects, and strengthening himself in weak places. So that although the
mere appearance of such a person as Duke Ludovico on the frontier was
sufficient to cause France to lose Milan the first time, to make her lose
her grip of it the second time was only possible when all the world was
against her, and after her armies had been defeated and driven out of
Italy; which was the result of the causes above mentioned. Nevertheless it
was taken from her both the first and the second time. The general causes
of the first 1088 have been already discussed; it remains now to be seen
what were the causes of the second 1088 and by what means France could
have avoided it, or what measures might have been taken by another ruler
in that position which were not taken by the King of France. Be it
observed, therefore, that those states which on annexation are united to a
previously existing state may or may not be of the same nationality and
language. If they are, it is very easy to hold them, especially if they
are not accustomed to freedom; and to possess them securely it suffices
that the family of the princes which formerly governed them be extinct.
For the rest, their old condition not being disturbed, and there being no
dissimilarity of customs, the people settle down quietly under their new
rulers, as is seen in the case of Burgundy, Brittany, Gascony, and
Normandy, which have been so long united to France; and although there may
be some slight differences of language, the customs of the people are
nevertheless similar, and they can get along well together Whoever obtains
possession of such territories and wishes to retain them must bear in mind
two things: the one, that the blood of their old rulers be extinct; the
other, to make no alteration either in their laws or in their taxes; in
this way they will in a very short space of time become united with their
old possessions and form one state.
But
when dominions are acquired in a province differing in language, laws and
customs, the difficulties to be overcome are great, and it requires good
fortune as well as great industry to retain them; one of the best and most
certain means of doing so would be for the new ruler to take up his
residence there. This would render possession more secure and durable, and
it is what the Turk has done in Greece. In spite of all the other measures
taken by him to hold that state, it would not have been possible to retain
it had he not gone to live there. Being on the spot, disorders can be seen
as they arise and can quickly be remedied, but living at a distance, they
are only heard of when they get beyond remedy. Besides which, the province
is not despoiled by your officials, the subjects being able to obtain
satisfaction by direct recourse to their prince; and wishing to be loyal
they have more reason to love him, and should they be otherwise inclined
they will have greater cause to fear him. Any external Power who wishes to
assail that state will be less disposed to do so; so that as long as he
resides there he will be very hard to dispossess.
The
other and better remedy is to plant colonies in one or two of those places
which form as it were the keys of the land, for it is necessary either to
do this or to maintain a large force of armed men. The colonies will cost
the prince little; with little or no expense on his part, he can send and
maintain them; he only injures those whose lands and houses are taken to
give to the new inhabitants, and these form but a small proportion of the
state, and those who are injured, remaining poor and scattered, can never
do any harm to him, and all the others are, on the one hand, not injured
and therefore easily pacified; and, on the other, are fearful of offending
lest they should be treated like those who have been dispossessed. To
conclude, these colonies cost nothing, are more faithful, and give less
offense; and the injured parties being poor and scattered are unable to do
mischief, as I have shown. For it must be noted, that men must either be
caressed or else annihilated; they will revenge themselves for small
injuries, but cannot do so for great ones; the injury therefore that we do
to a man must be such that we need not fear his vengeance. But by
maintaining a garrison instead of colonists, one will spend much more, and
consume all the revenues of that state in guarding it, so that the
acquisition will result in a loss, besides giving much greater offense,
since it injures every one in that state with the quartering of the army
on it; which being an inconvenience felt by all, every one becomes an
enemy, and these are enemies which can do mischief, as, though beaten,
they remain in their own homes. In every way, therefore, a garrison is as
useless as colonies are useful.
Further,
the ruler of a foreign province as described, should make himself the
leader and defender of his less powerful neighbours, and endeavour to
weaken the stronger ones, and take care that they are not invaded by some
foreigner not less powerful than himself. And it will be always the case
that he will be invited to intervene at the request of those who are
discontented either through ambition or fear, as was seen when the Ætolians
invited the Romans into Greece; and in whatever province they entered, it
was always at the request of the inhabitants. And the rule is that when a
powerful foreigner enters a province, all the less powerful inhabitants
become his adherents, moved by the envy they bear to those ruling over
them; so much so that with regard to these minor potentates he has no
trouble whatever in winning them over, for they willingly join forces with
the state that he has acquired. He has merely to be careful that they do
not assume too much power and authority, and he can easily with his own
forces and their favour put down those that are powerful and remain in
everything arbiter of that province. And he who does not govern well in
this way will soon lose what he has acquired, and while he holds it will
meet with infinite difficulty and trouble.
The
Romans in the provinces they took, always followed this policy; they
established colonies, inveigled the less powerful without increasing their
strength, put down the most powerful and did not allow foreign rulers to
obtain influence in them. I will adduce the province of Greece as a sole
example. They made friends with the Achæans and the Ætolians, the
kingdom of Macedonia was cast down, and Antiochus driven out, nor did they
allow the merits of the Achæans or the Ætolians to gain them any
increase of territory, nor did the persuasions of Philip induce them to
befriend him without reducing his influence, nor could the power of
Antiochus make them consent to allow him to hold any state in that
province.
For
the Romans did in these cases what all wise princes should do, who
consider not only present but also future discords and diligently guard
against them; for being foreseen they can easily be remedied, but if one
waits till they are at hand, the medicine is no longer in time as the
malady has become incurable; it happening with this as with those hectic
fevers, as doctors say, which at their beginning are easy to cure but
difficult to recognize, but in course of time when they have not at first
been recognized and treated, become easy to recognize and difficult to
cure. Thus it happens in matters of state; for knowing afar off (which it
is only given to a prudent man to do) the evils that are brewing, they are
easily cured. But when, for want of such knowledge, they are allowed to
grow so that every one can recognize them, there is no longer any remedy
to be found. Therefore, the Romans, observing disorders while yet remote,
were always able to find a remedy, and never allowed them to increase in
order to avoid a war; for they knew that war is not to be avoided, and can
be deferred only to the advantage of the other side; they therefore
declared war against Philip and Antiochus in Greece, so as not to have to
fight them in Italy, though they might at the time have avoided either;
this they did not choose to do, never caring to do that which is now every
day to be heard in the mouths of our wise men, namely to enjoy the
advantages of delay, but preferring to trust their own virtue and
prudence; for time brings with it all things, and may produce
indifferently either good or evil.
But
let us return to France and examine whether she did any of these things;
and I will speak not of Charles, but of Louis as the one whose proceedings
can be better seen, as he held possession in Italy for a longer time; you
will then see that he did the opposite of all those things which must be
done to keep possession of a foreign state. King Louis was called into
Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who wished by his coming to gain
half of Lombardy. I will not blame the king for coming nor for the part he
took, because wishing to plant his foot in Italy, and not having friends
in the country, on the contrary the conduct of King Charles having caused
all doors to be closed to him, he was forced to accept what friendships he
could find, and his schemes would have speedily been successful if he had
made no mistakes in his other proceedings.
The
king then, having acquired Lombardy, immediately won back the reputation
lost by Charles. Genoa yielded, the Florentines became his friends, the
Marquis of Mantua, the Dukes of Ferrara and Bentivogli, the Lady of Forli,
the Lords of Faenza, Pesaro, Rimini, Camerino, and Piombino, the
inhabitants of Lucca, of Pisa, and of Siena, all approached him with
offers of friendship. The Venetians might then have seen the effects of
their temerity, how to gain a few cities in Lombardy they had made the
king ruler over two-thirds of Italy.
Consider
how little difficulty the king would have had in maintaining his
reputation in Italy if he had observed the aforesaid rules, and kept a
firm and sure hold over all those friends of his, who being many in number
and weak, and fearful, one of the Church, another of the Venetians, were
always obliged to hold fast to him, and by whose aid he could easily make
sure of any who were still great. But he was hardly in Milan before he did
exactly the opposite, by giving aid to Pope Alexander to occupy the
Romagna. Nor did he perceive that, in taking this course, he weakened
himself, by casting off his friends and those who had fled to his
protection, and strengthened the Church by adding further temporal powers
to the spiritual power, which gives it such authority. And having made the
first mistake, he was obliged to follow it up, whilst, to put a stop to
the ambition of Alexander and prevent him becoming ruler of Tuscany, he
was forced to come to Italy. And not content with having increased the
power of the Church and lost his friends, he now coveting the kingdom of
Naples, divided it with the king of Spain; and where he alone was the
arbiter of Italy, he now brought in a companion, so that the ambitious of
that province who were dissatisfied with him might have some one else to
appeal to; and where he might have left in that kingdom a king tributary
to himself, he dispossessed him in order to bring in another who was
capable of driving him out.
The
desire to acquire possessions is a very natural and ordinary thing, and
when those men do it who can do so successfully, they are always praised
and not blamed, but when they cannot and yet want to do so at all costs,
they make a mistake deserving of great blame. If France, therefore, with
her own forces could have taken Naples, she ought to have done so; if she
could not, she ought not to have shared it. And if the partition of
Lombardy with the Venetians is to be excused, as having been the means of
allowing the French king to set foot in Italy, this other partition
deserves blame, not having the excuse of necessity.
Louis
had thus made these five mistakes: he had crushed the smaller Powers,
increased the power in Italy of one potentate, brought into the land a
very powerful foreigner, he had not come to live there himself, nor had he
established any colonies. Still these mistakes, if he had lived, might not
have injured him, had he not made the sixth, that of taking the state from
the Venetians; for, if he had not strengthened the Church and brought the
Spaniards into Italy, it would have been right and necessary to humble
them; having once taken those measures, he ought never to have consented
to their ruin; because, had the Venetians been strong, it would have kept
the others from making attempts on Lombardy, partly because the Venetians
would not have consented to any measures by which they did not get it for
themselves, and partly because the others would not have wanted to take it
from France to give it to Venice, and would not have had the courage to
attack both.
If
any one urges that King Louis yielded Romagna to Alexander and the Kingdom
of Naples to Spain in order to avoid war, I reply with the reasons already
given, that one ought never to allow a disorder to take place in order to
avoid war, for war is not thereby avoided, but only deferred to your
disadvantage. And if others allege the promise given by the king to the
pope to undertake that enterprise for him, in return for the dissolution
of his marriage and for the cardinalship of Rohan, I reply with what I
shall say later on about the faith of princes and how it is to be
observed. Thus King Louis lost Lombardy through not observing any of those
conditions which have been observed by others who have taken provinces and
wished to retain them. Nor is this any miracle, but very reasonable and
natural. I spoke of this matter with Cardinal Rohan at Nantes when
Valentine, as Cesare Borgia, son of Pope Alexander, was commonly called,
was occupying the Romagna, for on Cardinal Rohan saying to me that the
Italians did not understand war, I replied that the French did not
understand politics, for if they did they would never allow the Church to
become so great. And experience shows us that the greatness in Italy of
the Church and also of Spain have been caused by France, and her ruin has
proceeded from them. From which may be drawn a general rule, which never
or very rarely fails, that whoever is the cause of another becoming
powerful, is ruined himself; for that power is produced by him either
through craft or force; and both of these are suspected by the one who has
been raised to power.
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