12
The
Different Kinds of Militia and Mercenary Soldiers
Having
now discussed fully the qualities of these principalities of which I
proposed to treat, and partially considered the causes of their prosperity
or failure, and having also showed the methods by which many have sought
to obtain such states, it now remains for me to treat generally of the
methods, both offensive and defensive, that can be used in each of them.
We have said already how necessary it i8 for a prince to have his
foundations good, otherwise he is certain to be ruined. The chief
foundations of all states, whether new, old, or mixed, are good laws and
good arms. And as there cannot be good laws where there are not good arms,
and where there are good arms there must be good laws, I will not now
discuss the laws, but will speak of the arms.
I
say, therefore, that the arms by which a prince defends his possessions
are either his own, or else mercenaries, or auxiliaries, or mixed. The
mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous, and if any one
supports his state by the arms of mercenaries, he will never stand firm or
sure, as they are disunited, ambitious, without discipline, faithless,
bold amongst friends, cowardly amongst enemies, they have no fear of God,
and keep no faith with men. Ruin is only deferred as long as the assault
is postponed; in peace you are despoiled by them, and in war by the enemy.
The cause of this is that they have no love or other motive to keep them
in the field beyond a trifling wage, which is not enough to make them
ready to die for you. They are quite willing to be your soldiers so long
as you do not make war, but when war comes, it is either fly or decamp
altogether. I ought to have little trouble in proving this, since the ruin
of Italy is now caused by nothing else but through her having relied for
many years on mercenary arms. These did indeed help certain individuals to
power, and appeared courageous when matched against each other, but when
the foreigner came they showed their worthlessness. Thus it came about
that King Charles of France was allowed to take Italy without the
slightest trouble, and those who said that it was owing to our sins, spoke
the truth, but it was not the sins they meant but those that I have
related. And as it was the sins of princes, they too have suffered the
punishment.
I
will explain more fully the defects of these arms. Mercenary captains are
either very capable men or not; if they are, you cannot rely upon them,
for they will always aspire to their own greatness, either by oppressing
you, their master, or by oppressing others against your intentions; but if
the captain is not an able man, he will generally ruin you. And if it is
replied to this, that whoever has armed forces will do the same, whether
these are mercenary or not, I would reply that as armies are to be used
either by a prince or by a republic, the prince must go in person to take
the position of captain, and the republic must send its own citizens. If
the man sent turns out incompetent, it must change him; and if capable,
keep him by law from going beyond the proper limits. And it is seen by
experience that only princes and armed republics make very great progress,
whereas mercenary forces do nothing but harm, and also an armed republic
submits less easily to the rule of one of its citizens than a republic
armed by foreign forces.
Rome
and Sparta were for many centuries well armed and free. The Swiss are well
armed and enjoy great freedom. As an example of mercenary armies in
antiquity there are the Carthaginians, who were oppressed by their
mercenary soldiers, after the termination of the first war with the
Romans, even while they still had their own citizens as captains. Philip
of Macedon was made captain of their forces by the Thebans after the death
of Epaminondas, and after gaining the victory he deprived them of liberty.
The Milanese, on the death of Duke Philip, hired Francesco Sforza against
the Venetians, who having overcome the enemy at Caravaggio, allied himself
with them to oppress the Milanese his own employers. The father of this
Sforza, being a soldier in the service of Queen Giovanna of Naples, left
her suddenly unarmed, by which she was compelled, in order not to lose the
kingdom, to throw herself into the arms of the King of Aragon. And if the
Venetians and Florentines have in times past increased their dominions by
means of such forces, and their captains have not made themselves princes
but have defended them, I reply that the Florentines in this case have
been favoured by chance, for of the capable leaders whom they might have
feared, some did not conquer, some met with opposition, and others
directed their ambition elsewhere. The one who did not conquer was Sir
John Hawkwood, whose fidelity could not be known as he was not victorious,
but every one will admit that, had he conquered, the Florentines would
have been at his mercy. Sforza had always the Bracceschi against him which
served as a mutual check. Francesco directed his ambition towards
Lombardy; Braccio against the Church and the kingdom of Naples.
But
let us look at what occurred a short time ago. The Florentines appointed
Paolo Vitelli their captain, a man of great prudence, who had risen from a
private station to the highest reputation. If he had taken Pisa no one can
deny that it was highly important for the Florentines to retain his
friendship, because had he become the soldier of their enemies they would
have had no means of opposing him; and if they had retained him they would
have been obliged to obey him. As to the Venetians, if one considers the
progress they made, it will be seen that they acted surely and gloriously
so long as they made war with their own forces; that it was before they
commenced their enterprises on land that they fought courageously with
their own gentlemen and armed populace, but when they began to fight on
land they abandoned this virtue, and began to follow the Italian custom.
And at the commencement of their land conquests they had not much to fear
from their captains, their territories not being very large, and their
reputation being great, but as their possessions increased, as they did
under Carmagnola, they had an example of their mistake. For seeing that he
was very powerful, after he had defeated the Duke of Milan, and knowing,
on the other hand, that he was but lukewarm in this war, they considered
that they would not make any more conquests with him, and they neither
would nor could dismiss him, for fear of losing what they had already
gained. In order to make sure of him they were therefore obliged to
execute him. They then had for captains Bartolommeo da Bergamo, Roberto da
San Severino, Count di Pitigliano, and such like, from whom they had to
fear loss instead of gain, as happened subsequently at Vaila, where in one
day they lost what they had laboriously gained in eight hundred years; for
with these forces, only slow and trifiing acquisitions are made, but
sudden and miraculous losses. And as I have cited these examples from
Italy, which has now for many years been governed by mercenary forces, I
will now deal more largely with them, so that having seen their origin and
progress, they can be better remedied.
You
must understand that in these latter times, as soon as the empire began to
be repudiated in Italy and the Pope to gain greater reputation in temporal
matters, Italy was divided into many states; many of the principal cities
took up arms against their nobles, who, favoured by the emperor, had held
them in subjection, and the Church encouraged this in order to increase
its temporal power. In many other cities one of the inhabitants be came
prince. Thus Italy having fallen almost entirely into the hands of the
Church and a few republics, and the priests and other citizens not being
accustomed to bear arms, they began to hire foreigners as soldiers. The
first to bring into reputation this kind of militia was Alberigo da Como,
a native of Romagna Braccio and Sforza, who were in their day the arbiters
of Italy were, amongst others, trained by him. After these came all those
others who up to the present day have commanded the armies of Italy, and
the result of their prowess has been that Italy has been overrun by
Charles, preyed on by Louis, tyrannized over by Ferrando, and insulted by
the Swiss. The system adopted by them was, in the first place, to increase
their own reputation by discrediting the infantry. They did this because,
as they had no country and lived on their earnings, a few foot soldiers
did not augment their reputation, and they could not maintain a large
number and therefore they restricted themselves almost entirely to
cavalry, by which with a smaller number they were well paid and honoured.
They reduced things to such a state that in an army of 20,000 soldiers
there were not 2,000 foot. They had also used every means to spare
themselves and the soldiers any hardship or fear by not killing each other
in their encounters, but taking prisoners without expectation of ransom.
They made no attacks on fortifications by night; and those in the
fortifications did not attack the tents at night, they made no stockades
or ditches around their camps, and did not take the field in winter. All
these things were permitted by their military code, and adopted, as we
have said, to avoid trouble and danger, so that they have reduced Italy to
slavery and degradation.
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