Map Explanation: Sons of Confederate Veterans
Decided on June 18, 2015, Reed v. Town of Gilbert was the third and final First Amendment opinion of the 2014 Term. Justice Breyer wrote the opinion for a Court divided 5-4 on judgment. Per SCOTUSBlog, the holding in Condeferate Veterans is "Because Texas’s specialty license plate designs constitute government speech, it was entitled to reject a proposal for plates featuring a Confederate battle flag."
Since the 3-degree citation network linking back to 1983's Perry Ed Assn v. Perry Local Educators Assn case is rather large (33 cases), this map is easiest to read with Citation Degrees set to "two (2)". This will display the most relevant cases in the network. It is also useful to select Map Type as "Spaeth" to get a sense of prior precedent.
Under the Spaeth view, we can see that Confederate Veterans is coded as a "conservative" decision by the Supreme Court Database (Spaeth). This is consistent with Spaeth's usual practice of codeing unsuccessful First Amendment challenges as "liberal." See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum (2009 case, coded conservative; part of two-degree network - upholding government decision to refuse to erect donated monument in park on grounds of government speech). See also Johanns v. Livestock Marketing (2005 case, coded conservative, part of three-degree network - finding government-speech doctrine applicable where government approved promotional advertizing for beef).
Confederate Veterans was a controversial government speech case. This map features a broader network of cases dealing with public forum doctrine. The key quote from Confederate Veterans that justifies this choice of network anchor is:
The parties agree that Texas’s specialty license plates are not a “traditional public forum,” such as a street or a park, “which ha[s] immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, ha[s] been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.” Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983).
Map Explanation: Williams-Yulee
Decided on April 29, 2015, Williams-Yulee v. Flordia Bar was the first First Amendment opinion handed down in the 2014 Term. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion for a Court split 5-4 on judgment. Per SCOTUSBlog, the holding in Williams-Yulee is "Florida's ban on the personal solicitation of campaign funds by candidates for judgeships does not violate the First Amendment."
Since the 3-degree citation network linking back to 1989's Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm case is rather large (30 cases), this map is easiest to read with Citation Degrees set to "two (2)". This will display the most relevant cases in the network. It is also useful to select Map Type as "Spaeth" to get a sense of prior precedent.
Under the Spaeth view, we can see that Williams-Yulee is currently coded as a "liberal" decision by the Supreme Court Database (Spaeth). This seems a little odd since Spaeth usually codes successful First Amendment challenges as "liberal." See, e.g., Republican Party of Minnesota v. White (2002 case, coded liberal; part of two-degree network - striking down Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct that prohibited candidates from "announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues."). Compare Burson v. Freeman (1992 case, coded conservative, part of two-degree network - upholding restriction on electioneering around polling centers).
Williams-Yulee is an interesting case because it upheld a restriction on speech under strict scrutiny. It shows that "strict in theory, fatal in fact" is not always true. By anchoring the citation network to Eu, this map was designed to capture cases dealing with strict scrutiny. The key quote from Williams-Yulee that justifies this choice of network anchor is:
As we have long recognized, speech about public issues and the qualifications of candidates for elected office commands the highest level of First Amendment protection. See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989). Indeed, in our only prior case concerning speech restrictions on a candidate for judicial office, this Court and both parties assumed that strict scrutiny applied. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002).
Map Explanation: Heffernan
Decided on April 26, 2016, Heffernan v. City of Patterson was the first First Amendment opinion handed down in the 2015 Term. Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinion for a Court split 6-2 on judgment. Per SCOTUSBlog, the holding in Heffernan is "When an employer demotes an employee out of a desire to prevent the employee from engaging in protected political activity, the employee is entitled to challenge that unlawful action under the First Amendment and Section 1983 even if the employer's actions are based on a factual mistake about the employee's behavior."
Since the 3-degree citation network linking back to 1973's USCSC v. National Association of Letter Carriers case is rather large (30 cases), this map is easiest to read with Citation Degrees set to "two (2)". This will display the most relevant cases in the network.
Heffernan actually involved two lines of doctrine -- First Amendment law concerning protected political activity and Section 1983 law regarding mistake and protected political rights. This map focuses on the First Amendment doctrine. The key quote from Heffernan that explains how this network is constructed :
The First Amendment generally prohibits government officials from dismissing or demoting an employee because of the employee’s engagement in constitutionally protected political activity. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U. S. 507 (1980); but cf. Civil Service Comm’n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 564 (1973). In this case a government official demoted an employee because the official believed, but incorrectly believed, that the employee had supported a particular candidate for mayor. The question is whether the official’s factual mistake makes a critical legal difference. Even though the employee had not in fact engaged in protected political activity, did his demotion “deprive” him of a “right…secured by the Constitution”? 42 U. S. C. §1983. We hold that it did.
Map Explanation: Reed
Decided on June 18, 2015, Reed v. Town of Gilbert was the second First Amendment opinion of the 2014 Term. Justice Thomas wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. Per SCOTUSBlog, the holding in Reed is "The provisions of a municipality’s sign code that impose more stringent restrictions on signs directing the public to the meeting of a non-profit group than on signs conveying other messages are content-based regulations of speech that cannot survive strict scrutiny."
Since the 3-degree citation network linking back to 1989's Consolidated Edison Co v. Public Service Commission case is very large (49 cases), this map is easiest to read with Citation Degrees set to "two (2)". This will display the most relevant cases in the network. It is also useful to select Map Type as "Spaeth" to get a sense of prior precedent.
Under the Spaeth view, we can see that Reed is coded as a "liberal" decision by the Supreme Court Database (Spaeth). This is consistent with Spaeth's usual practice of codeing successful First Amendment challenges as "liberal." See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gileo (1994 case, coded liberal; part of two-degree network - striking down as an impermissible content-based restriction a city ordinance that prohibited homeowners from displaying certain kinds signs but not others). Compare Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent (1984 case, coded conservative, part of two-degree network - upholding as content-neutral a restriction on posting all kinds of signs on public property).
Reed presents a rather straightforward application of content-basis analysis. By anchoring the citation network to Con Ed v. Public Service Commissions, this map was designed to capture cases dealing with content basis. The key quote from Reed that justifies this choice of network anchor is:
[I]t is well established that “[t]he First Amendment’s hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.” Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980). Thus, a speech regulation targeted at specific subject matter is content-based even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints within that subject matter. Ibid.