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First Lecture |
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Government and Information |
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Government Information Managers |
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Information As a Resource |
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History of Computing |
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Platform Wars |
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Toward 2000 |
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Government runs on information. |
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Information is a major input to government
programs; and a primary output of government activity. |
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Imagine no telephones, no fax machines, no
copiers. |
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Imagine no computers. |
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No payments to senior citizens, dependent
children, veterans, Medicare and Medicaid. |
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Loss of ability to access criminal justice
information. |
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These are mission-critical applications, not
only important to the agency responsible for administering the programs,
but for the State as a whole. |
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And,
worst of all, NO PAYCHECKS. |
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Value of information. |
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A source of supply |
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A source of wealth or revenue |
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A source of expertise |
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An ability to handle a situation |
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Attributes of Information |
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Non-Consumable |
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Indivisible |
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Reproducible |
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Diffusive |
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Leaky |
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1900 – 1949: Conception |
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Computers as electronic “super” calculators,
useful only for complex scientific and engineering calculations (WW
II);
scientific curiosities. |
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1950s: Birth of the “Electronic Brain” |
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“Stored program” computers and programming
languages. |
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“Stored program” computers could carry out
varied tasks; programming languages were introduced (e.g., COBOL and
Fortran). But computers were essentially PCs — one user at a time,
communicating with the machine through toggle switches, paper tapes, and punched
cards. |
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Large models involving millions of calculations |
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Computers could be used for large models
involving millions of calculations (planning factory schedules, forecasting
the weather, predicting elections). Lack of permanent storage (no disks or
tapes) precluded use in day-to-day business activities. During the entire
1950s, only a few dozen machine were sold, each costing hundreds of
thousands of dollars (in 1950 money). |
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Visions of “data-based” organizations |
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Modern operating systems and permanent storage |
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Modern operating systems were developed that
allowed the computer to be a shared, constantly available resource.
Permanent storage (particularly magnetic disks) allowed databases, which in
turn promoted a vision of a “data-based” organization, in which the
computer could act as central coordinator for company-wide activities. |
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Indispensable for preserving large organizations |
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By the end of the 1960s computers had become
indispensable for large organizations — but, they didn’t change these
organizations, they preserved them, keeping them functional as they grew.
Large organizations that were previously drowning in paperwork suddenly
found that computers allowed them to preserve their existing structures.
Rather than changing existing business processes and practices, computers
made them faster. The computer made large, complex, centrally-controlled
bureaucracies possible — even though all they did was automate many of the
inflexibilities and overheads of the past (and added a few of their own). |
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IT costs money |
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Modern operating systems and permanent storage |
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By 1970, organizations were spending millions of
dollars on IT, a previously non-existent budget category. Along with the
big computers and systems, organizations invested in computer departments,
programmers, professional and support staff, and custom applications
software. |
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Sigh of relief |
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By 1970 it appeared that most companies had
finally built most of the applications that made sense. Expensive, probably
worth it, and finally containable in cost. |
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Technology breakthroughs — in on-line databases,
terminals, networks, and large scale permanent storage — caused existing
applications to become obsolete and created a need for a whole class of new
applications (circa 1970). |
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The concepts associated with on-line databases —
databases connected to and fed by networked terminals — promised an end to
management isolation if management would only:
* view information as a key resource;
* build a totally consistent,
company-wide, database;
* ensure that information was
entered into and
updated in that database as soon as it entered
the company. |
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The vision — all of the organization’s
information is instantly available in up-to-date, accurate, and consistent
form at the touch of a keyboard, allowing faster operations and enabling
everyone in the organization to stay in touch with the real world. |
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IT costs more money (1% or ½ – 10% of budget) |
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The new class of technology cost even more than
before, but by the end of the 1970s a rule of thumb was emerging about
technology spending: organizations should target 1% of their expense
budgets on IT. |
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But the rule was rough, 1% held as an industry
average for manufacturing; but 10% of non-interest expense was more the
norm for banks, investment houses, and insurance companies. While ½% was
closer to the average for retail organizations. |
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In the 1980s, large computer technology stood
still (comparatively). |
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Although mainframe computers continued to get
better, cheaper, and faster, with new features, large computer technology
at the end of the 1980s was very similar to technology at the beginning of
the decade. A mainframe application built in 1980 looked virtually
identical to one built in 1990. |
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Focus shifted to designing and building
applications in some kind of disciplined fashion. |
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In 1970, organizations had dreams of on-line
corporations, wired desktops, totally consistent databases. By, 1980,
reality set in — the vision was harder to achieve than anyone imagined. |
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In the 1980s, the industry focused on developing
the necessary tools, disciplines, and methodologies to make predictably
possible the big systems required by the dream. Promised applications had
to arrive on schedule and in good working order. |
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By 1990, MIS organizations had learned (more or
less) how to build predictable and reliable big systems — using
methodologies that prescribe ways to build high-quality systems, and CASE
(computer-aided software engineering) tools to support analysts, designers,
and developers in building bigger systems better. |
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A methodology is a formal prescription for
describing how software should be built. They can range from loose
frameworks describing basic design approaches to 60-book encyclopedias that
define every step and function required to build an application. |
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Fundamental insight: software design is a formal
process. |
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CASE tools offer ways to use computers to help
automate the design process and the associated methodologies. |
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By 1985, PCs and their tools (WordStar, 1-2-3
(VisiCalc) and dBase) were starting to make users think in new ways. |
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First, although they only addressed special
needs, these applications also were dramatically easier to learn and use
than mainframe applications. And, the tools could be used to build custom
applications – |
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Why wait for MIS to build a forecasting system,
when your
local hacker can build the same system in three days? |
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Why wait, when the 3-day system will be easier
to use, more flexible and run on cheaper hardware? |
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And, why wait when the MIS system will take two
years, cost tens of thousands of dollars, and then be too expensive to run
anyway? |
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In 1985 PCs were not applicable to business
computing: they could not be used to build run-the-business applications. |
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First (and most important), PC applications
couldn’t share data. |
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Second, they were not capable of handling large
amounts of data. |
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In 1985, MIS folks looked at PCs seriously for
the first time — and they didn’t like what the saw. |
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To the MIS folks who were building mission
critical apps, PCs were irrelevant. PCs lacked sophisticated time-sharing
and transaction oriented operating systems, had no industrial strength
databases, no batch-scheduling facilities, no CASE tools, no modern
programming languages. AND, the little applications being built had none of
the fail-safe mechanisms or design methodologies that MIS folks now knew
were critical to creating bullet-proof applications. |
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Thus arose the cultural split we all live with
today. |
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A new breed came out of the ‘80s: yesterday
teenage hackers and dBase and 1-2-3 programmers have become today’s
client/server gurus. Yesterday’s computer club president is today’s network
administrator. AND, the two sides still don’t talk to each other, the PC
professionals and large system professionals still don’t talk to each other
— they have different value systems, different technical backgrounds, and
different beliefs. |
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Mainframe and associated costs up from 1% to
1.5%. |
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Mainframe systems run the business, but they are
hugely expensive, hard to use, inflexible, and time consuming to develop.
Still, the systems pay their own way — they run the business. Every
transaction, every piece of work done, is justified based on ROI (return on
investment). New mainframe systems don’t get built without a business
justification. |
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PCs, a previously nonexistent budget category,
have also jumped to 1.5% of organization budgets in 10 years. |
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The problem is that PCs can’t be used to run the
business. |
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PCs make individuals more productive. They’re
easy to use, and application development is relatively quick and
flexible. Although individually
inexpensive, in the aggregate, they cost as much as mainframes. They require
support, network connections and servers, and a variety of other
infrastructure and orgware costs. Worst of all, the costs can’t be
justified on a ROI basis because PCs meet individual, not organizational,
needs. |
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Something has to give. |
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Mainframe and associated costs up from 1% to
1.5%. |
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Are fancier (and longer) memos better memos? Do
they contribute to the “bottom-line”? |
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Are managers good typists? |
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PCs spoil users (GUI). |
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Something has to give. |
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The solution doesn’t start with the technology,
it starts with the organization of the business. |
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The Business Front |
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Business Process Re-engineering (and TQM) |
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Moving decision making to the front lines |
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The Technology Front |
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Information access and sharing (LANs, WANs) |
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Distributed computing |
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Client/server computing |
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