Misbehavior in Organizations: A Motivational Framework

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Yoav Vardi is on leave from Tel Aviv University.

M y reason for accepting this paper is well reflected in a comment from one of its reviewers: This paper "...tackles an area that is long overdue for some conceptual clarification, theoretical development and empirical research. I hope that publishing this piece will start a burst of research on this neglected and important topic."

The thinking and resultant framework presented in this paper by Yoav Vardi and Yoash Wiener provide us with a sense of the research possibilities such an approach might engender in the study of organizational misbehaviour. Their definitions help us tease out some of the complexities of this phenomenon. Their framework is presented in a form that allows for rigorous testing. The propositions stated are suggestive of some of the interesting questions about misbehaviour that could be investigated in an effort to better understand why misbehaviour occurs and what its consequences might be for individuals, organizations and societies. My hope, like that of the reviewer is that the paper will motivate some thoughtful research on the topic.

Peter Frost

Abstract

Observers of organizations recognize now that work related misconduct is both pervasive and costly. There is ample evidence that members of organizations sabotage processes, steal company property, harass others, cheat the government, or mislead customers. Companies and the public pay dearly.

What are the motivational forces that drive organizational members to exhibit such varied forms of misconduct? Are these forces different from those that drive them to engage in constructive behavior? What kinds of personal and organizational factors influence such acts of intentional misbehavior?

Our basic objectives in this paper are three-fold: first, to formally define a new construct of Organizational Misbehavior (OMB), and to discuss the theoretical implications of the definition; second, to identify different types of OMB; and third, to develop a conceptual framework that would allow the inclusion of OMB in a comprehensive theory of work motivation, applicable to both proper and improper conduct.

We define Organizational Misbehavior as "any intentional action by members of organizations that violates core organizational and/or societal norms." A crucial element in the definition is the *intention* underlying the misbehavior. It therefore serves as the basis for the distinction among three types of organizational misbehavior: (a) OMB Type S, misbehavior that intends to benefit the self; (b) OMB Type O, misbehavior that intends to benefit the organization; and (c) OMB Type D, misbehavior that intends to inflict damage.

In order to integrate these forms of misconduct within a comprehensive motivational framework, we use the distinction between normative and instrumental sources of motivation. We propose that people who engage in OMB Type S are primarily motivated by self-interest consideration (i.e., instrumental processes), whereas those that perpetrate OMB Type O do so mostly because of strong identification with and loyalty to their organization (i.e., normative processes). OMB Type D, however, may be triggered by either instrumental or normative forces, or by both at the same time.

The various instrumental and normative factors that influence misbehavior are not only personal; they can also be organizational. On the individual level, we refer to such factors as the stage of moral development and personal need satisfaction. At the organization level, we examine the role of such factors as organization culture and cohesiveness. We finally use the instrumental-normative framework to derive a set of formal propositions about the effects of some of these factors on the form and intensity of OMB.

We hope that such propositions and the theoretical framework presented here, will be helpful in furthering our understanding of behavior in organizations, both "good" and "bad." (*Misbehavior; Intentional Behavior; Normative Forces; Instrumental Forces*)

Introduction

Organization scientists and practitioners are increasingly becoming more aware that patterns of work-related misconduct by members of organizations are prevalent, and that their consequences for work organizations are significant. Moreover, over the years, researchers from most social science disciplines (e.g., psychology, sociology, social psychology, criminology, management), have studied related phenomena and interpreted them from a variety of perspectives. These misbehaviors range from a mere breach or violation of psychological contracts (Kotter 1973, Rousseau 1989) to blatant acts bordering on criminal activity perpetrated against others and organizations (Henry 1978, Hollinger 1979). Such forms of misconduct appear to be universal. Most members of work organizations, it appears, engage in some form of misbehavior that is related to their work, albeit in varying degrees of intensity, severity and frequency. In fact, misbehavior is not restricted to certain employees; it has been recorded for both nonsupervisory and managerial members of different types of work organizations. Not surprisingly, then, both the economic and social costs of many forms of work- and organization-related misbehavior may, indeed, be quite substantial (e.g., Greenberg 1990, Murphy 1993).

Researchers have, in recent years, provided ample evidence for the large variety of such behaviors, and some examples may illustrate this wealth. Greenberg (1990) recently conducted a study of and reviewed the literature on employee theft, and Analoui and Kakabadse (1992) reported a longitudinal study of unconventional practices at work. Hollinger (1986) reviewed a considerable body of sociological and psychological literature on counterproductive behavior in organizations. Trevino (1986) discussed important contributions to management ethics, and Braithwaite (1985) extensively reviewed white-collar crime. In fact, the growing interest in specific events or phenomena such as whistle-blowing (Miceli and Near 1992), professional deviant behavior (Raelin 1986), concealing pertinent information (Reimann and Wiener 1988a), substance abuse (Trice and Sonnenstuhl 1988), sexual harassment at work (Gutek 1985), or even vandalism (DeMore et al. 1988), only underscores the need to better understand this "darker" side of organizational life.

Our review of the literature seems to demonstrate that misconduct in organizations has not only been viewed as pervasive, but, for the most part, as intentional work-related behavior. It also establishes that, at the same time, we may lack a systematic approach to the understanding of such behavior. Based on these observations, we develop in this paper a conceptual framework which assumes that misbehaviors in organizations differ and vary, and that members commit such acts intentionally. We will elaborate on these fundamental arguments in further sections.

Treatment of Misbehavior in Behavioral Sciences

Several attempts to systematize the treatment of phenomena related to organizational misbehavior have been reported in the past. Hollinger (1986) observed that sociological research on employee misbehavior (defined as deviance) has centered around two foci: "Production deviance" and "Property deviance." While both constitute rule-breaking behavior, the first includes various types of behavior that are counterproductive (e.g., substandard work, slowdowns, insubordination), and the second category pertains to acts against property and assets of the organization (e.g., theft, pilferage, embezzlement, vandalism). Hollinger (1986) employed Hirschi's "social bonding" model to identify antecedents for both types of misbehavior. Based on empirical analysis he concluded that such individual acts are more likely to occur when individual attachment (e.g., commitment) to an organization is low. Other antecedents that were found to affect "productivity deviance" are mostly related to group and peer pressures (e.g., Zey-Ferrell and Ferrell 1982), maladjustment (Raelin 1986), increased competitive pressures (Hegarty and Sims 1978), or disagreement with organizational goals and expectations (e.g., Gouldner 1954). Antecedents contributing to "property deviance", such as theft, may be feelings of injustice or exploitation (Hollinger and Clark 1982, 1983; Mars 1974), attempts to ease personal financial pressures (Merton 1938), moral laxity (Merriam 1977), available opportunities (Astor 1972), dissatisfaction with work (Mangioni and Quinn 1975), perceptions of pay inequity (Greenberg 1990), and feelings of frustration (Analoui and Kakabadse 1992). Similarly, vandalism, as property deviancy, was found to be associated with perceptions of inequity and mistreatment (DeMore et al. 1988).

Another major attempt to systematically deal with organizational misbehavior has been undertaken by Trevino (1986, 1992). Her focus is the interaction between personality and situational factors in determining ethical or unethical decisions among managers in organizations. In Trevino's model the individual level variables are the stage of moral development, ego strength, field dependence, and locus of control. The situational variables are the immediate job context, the organization culture, and characteristics of the work. Although the dependent variable (ethical/unethical behavior) is not formally defined, Trevino's work offers an extensive set of interactional propositions articulating specific predictions about unethical decisions and actions. Moreover, Trevino and Youngblood (1990) recently reported using hypothetical dilemmas in an experiment that provided partial empirical support for the multiple-influence model of managerial unethical decision making.

The present article offers a motivational framework of organizational misbehavior that is consistent with and expands Hollinger's and Trevino's contributions. However, it departs from previous work primarily in three respects. First, it offers a comprehensive definition of a new construct—Organizational MisBehavior (OMB)—which is inclusive of the various wrong-doings and counter-normative behaviors dealt with in past literature. Second, it develops a general typology of different types of OMB that allows for integration of previous notions. Third, and most importantly, it applies and expands an overall normative-instrumental model of work motivation to explain and predict different types of organizational misbehavior. This, integration, in turn, will allow predictions of both positive and negative forms of organizational behavior.

Toward a Definition of OMB

Definitions of behaviors that are considered as OMB may take a variety of approaches and properties depending on theoretical positions concerning (a) the criterion or yardstick against which OMB is determined, (b) the agent or agents who decide what constitutes OMB, and (c) the personal and organizational consequences of OMB. The position that our paper takes concerning these requirements is guided by one main principle: the resulting definition should be broad enough to integrate various types of misbehavior, yet capable of providing a foundation for a constructive and explanatory model of OMB. Consistent with this guideline we selected the concepts of values and norms as the criterion determining OMB, and viewed both

society at large and the organization as the defining agents. Since consequences of OMB can vary in different situations (e.g., functional or dysfunctional; negative or positive; short term or long term), we did not include them in the definition itself but, rather, as a dependent variable in the overall model.

ORGANIZATIONAL MISBEHAVIOR (OMB) is defined here as any intentional action by members of organizations that defies and violates (a) shared organizational norms and expectations, and/or (b) core societal values, mores and standards of proper conduct. Several elements of the definition require further elaboration. First, since the violation of "organizational norms and values" is the fundamental component in defining OMB, we must clarify what is meant by the construct "organization" in this context. Recognizing that most work organizations are complex social entities, often comprising multiple subunits and constituencies, the term "organization" does not convey a determinate entity. Rather, it represents the relevant unit of choice of an investigator, a manager, or a consultant interested in the phenomenon of OMB. They may, depending on their perspectives and special interests, refer to a work organization as a whole, or to any significant sector within it, such as a Strategic Business Unit. The important point is that explicit choices of the identity of the unit of interest must be made in order to identify the relevant core values against which a violation (and therefore OMB), may occur. Thus, throughout the paper, whenever the term "organization" is used, it should convey exactly this meaning.

Second, both overt action and its underlying intention are necessary to identify misbehavior; to define OMB without its underlying intention will result in including misbehavior that is unintentional or accidental. Hence, work-related actions that involve errors, mistakes, or even unconscious negligence and action-slips (e.g., a harmful mistake in a surgical procedure that is committed unintentionally) do not constitute OMB, despite their similar consequences in organizational as well as personal terms.

Third, the level of analysis is the individual rather than the group or the organization. Even though it is possible to apply the concept of OMB to misbehavior by groups (e.g., see Trice and Beyer, 1993, on deviant organizational subcultures) or by organizations (e.g., see Baucus and Near, 1991, on illegal corporate behavior), we focus here on individuals who are intentionally, actually and directly involved in some form of misbehavior. This is principally because the present

model proposes the role of *individual motivation* as a source of OMB. Fourth, values and norms pertain to both formal (laws, rules and regulations, standard operating procedures, etc.) and informal social expectations. Last, and significantly, the definition acknowledges the importance of both internal (intraorganizational) and external (societal) value systems in determining OMB.

Values and Norms: A General View

Because the concept of values is a central component in the analysis of OMB, a definition of the concept itself is necessary. In the social literature there are serious inconsistencies in the definition of value and in the distinctions between value and related constructs such as attitude, belief, and norm. Nevertheless, certain formulations that allow operational definitions and measurement have gained a fair degree of acceptance (see, for example, discussions by Brown, 1976; Fallding, 1965; Meglino et al. 1986). One such definition by Rokeach (1973, p. 5) states that "a value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence." In this definition values are viewed as forms of beliefs, and a major source of these values may be social expectations, particularly when they are shared. Thus, social values may indeed be viewed as normative beliefs complementing instrumental beliefs as antecedents of behavior (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). Further, values can be construed as internalized normative beliefs; once established, they may act as built-in normative guides for behavior, independent from the effect of rewards and punishments that are consequences of actions (Wiener 1982).

Rokeach's definition suggests that values shared by group members, particularly values concerning modes of conduct, become similar to norms guiding members toward uniformity in behavior. Others (e.g., Kilman 1985), however, distinguish between norms as more specific and often more explicit behavioral expectations, and values that are broader in scope than norms. (For thorough discussions on organizational value systems consult Wiener, 1988, and on societal level values consult Rokeach, 1973). The above analysis of the concepts of values and norms applies to various types of social units, including the two most congruous with the definition of OMB: work organizations and society at large.

OMB: Definitional Implications

The definition of OMB, as suggested above, implies four important features or attributes that seem useful for the construction of an integrative model, the measurement of variables, and the derivation of relevant predictions. We discuss these implications in the following sections.

Broadness of Scope of OMB. A basic implication of the definition is that a behavior does not have to violate *both* societal and organizational values in order to be identified as OMB. While such behaviors are not uncommon (e.g., unauthorized use of company property), it would be theoretically too narrow and not constructive to limit OMB to just such acts. According to the proposed definition, a behavior which may be consistent with organizational expectations but violates societal values (e.g., misleading customers), would be considered OMB in our model. Such organizationally condoned misbehaviors may be detrimental in the long run. Similarly, member behavior that is consistent with societal values but violates organizational expectations would be classified as OMB as well (e.g., whistle-blowing in an organization that does not sanction such a behavior). Unaccepted behaviors such as these may, however, be beneficial to organizations in the long run. We deem this kind of definitional broadness as essential in any attempt to construct an integrative and inclusive model of organizational misbehavior. It also provides a solid basis for a meaningful typology of misbehaviors that, in and of itself, would be useful in the overall understanding and prediction of organizational outcomes.

OMB: Is It "Good" or "Bad"? A second feature of the definition is that it does not necessarily equate norm and value violation with negative and undesirable behavior. For one thing, the definition itself does not make any references to consequences of OMB. Secondly, the desirability of any value-breaking behavior is inherently, by definition, a judgmental matter. In general, a value-violating behavior would be deemed "undesirable" by a collective of individuals holding that value, but may be seen "desirable" by another collective for which this behavior meets expectations. Thus, again, cheating customers may be evaluated as undesirable by members of society at large, but quite acceptable in a particular organizational setting. By the same token, whistle-blowing may be viewed as commendable action by members of society at large, but unacceptable in a context of a particular organization.

Results of OMB. While the proposed definition does not allow attribution of inherent, absolute value to

OMB, the consequences of OMB may be evaluated as to their degree of constructiveness for any given organization. The basic premise is that an organization may not be successful, in the long run, if it expects, or even allows, members to violate values of the larger society within which it operates. Thus, using the same examples of misbehavior, cheating customers would tend, in the long run, to be detrimental to organizations that allow it, but whistle-blowing may prove constructive (Miceli and Near 1994). OMB that simultaneously violates both societal and organizational values, such as harassing members, sabotaging work, or vandalizing equipment, is clearly destructive in its consequences.

OMB as a Variable. Since OMB is defined in relation to a set of core values of a particular social unit, and since such core values can be measured, OMB itself can be considered a variable. Moreover, because of the complex phenomenon it may tap, OMB should be treated as a multidimensional variable. Such an approach is not only useful for improved precision of the model, but is necessary for generating significant predictions about the phenomenon. In general, then, OMB may range from a low (benign) degree of misbehavior to a high (severe) degree of misbehavior, and the measurement may take two forms: behavioral and attitudinal.

The behavioral aspect of OMB can be measured using frequency counts of acts of misbehavior with respect to a given organizational unit, or with respect to individual members. This frequency measure can also be weighted by an index of severity of the observed misbehavior. Such an index may be comprised of two facets: (a) the centrality of the violated norm or value (for proposals related to the measurement of the centrality of a core value see, for example, Wiener, 1988), and (b) the degree of premeditation, preoccupation or planning seemingly involved in displaying the misbehavior. A second measure of OMB (attitudinal) may tap the individual's strength of the intention, predisposition, or propensity to engage in work- and organization-related misconduct. Although people tend to be quite reluctant to openly express intentions to misbehave, measures might be operationally developed in a questionnaire form, for example.

Such multifaceted indices (behavioral and attitudinal) are used by OB researchers to measure specific work behaviors about which individuals are hesitant to report as withdrawal behavior (e.g., actual incidents of turnover and intentions to leave the organization), or organizational citizenship behavior (e.g., actual altruistic deeds and pro-social attitudes). Indeed, using both

actual and attitudinal observations may facilitate a more meaningful classification of the misbehavior phenomenon.

Basic Types of OMB

An examination of a broad range of instances of norm violating behaviors would suggest that all such actions can be classified into three basic types in terms of the underlying *intention* of the misbehaving individual:

(a) Misbehaviors that are intended to benefit the self (OMB Type S). These misbehaviors are mostly internal to the organization, and usually victimize the employing organization or its members. Thus, such behaviors may have three categories of internal targets: (1) the work itself (e.g., distorting data); (2) the organization's property, resources, symbols or regulations (e.g., stealing and selling manufacturing secrets); and (3) other members (e.g., harassing peers). An exception to the above is a behavior by a member that appears to benefit the organization (e.g., overcharging customers), but is, in fact, intended to eventually benefit the individual (e.g., gaining a promotion).

(b) Misbehaviors that primarily intend to benefit the member's employing organization as a whole (OMB Type O). Those misbehaviors (e.g., falsifying records in order to improve chances of obtaining a contract for the organization), are mostly external in nature, usually directed toward outside "victims" such as other organizations, social institutions, public agencies, or customers. If the intention underlying this form of behavior is not primarily to benefit the organization, but is self-serving (e.g., for career considerations), it should not be classified as OMB Type O. More likely, this would be OMB Type S.

(c) Misbehaviors that primarily intend to inflict damage and be destructive (OMB Type D). Targets of these behaviors could be as listed above, both internal and external. Whereas the intentions underlying Type S and Type O misbehaviors are to *benefit* either the individual or the organization, the intention behind OMB Type D is to *hurt* others or the organization. Such intentional misbehaviors (e.g., sabotaging company-owned equipment) may be perpetrated by members either on their own initiative (e.g., as a revenge or a response to perceived or actual mistreatment), or on behalf of "significant others" (e.g., interfering with organizational operations to comply with Union's expectations). However, the underlying intention must be to cause some type of damage whether minor or considerable, subtle or visible.

While the above classification of OMB types is based on an internal psychological state (intentions), it seems

that the classifying task itself should not be highly subjective; in most cases, the proper classification should be fairly accurately derived from the overt misbehavior itself. As a rule, when more than one intention seem to underlie an act of OMB and when observations yield equivocal data, the intention considered as predominant would determine the classification. Again, we emphasize, the "intention" principle which is at the core of the OMB classification is necessary for the analysis of OMB within a motivational framework. We therefore elaborate on this requirement in the following section.

Theoretical Foundations

The present conception of OMB is predicated on the role of norms and values in guiding behavior of organizational members. Willful violation of such expectations (norms and values) constitutes misbehavior. Therefore, mainstream OB paradigms that make distinctions between normative, value-based processes, and instrumental-calculative ones in determining individual behavior in organizations might be also useful as a basis for a model of individual misbehavior. One such paradigm that has been effectively used in the literature to explain determinants of individual behavior, is Fishbein and Ajzen's behavioral intentions theory (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975).

The Fishbein and Ajzen Model

This model deals primarily with the prediction and understanding of behavioral intentions. It hypothesizes that an individual's behavior is a function of the intention to perform that behavior. A person's behavioral intention, in turn, is determined by two basic factors: (a) the attitude toward performing the act, that is, person's evaluation or affect with respect to the act, and (b) the subjective norm, i.e., perception of the totality of the normative pressures concerning the behavior. The first component—the person's attitude toward performing a particular act—is a function of beliefs concerning the consequences of the act and the value of the consequences for the person. These can be referred to as instrumental-cognitive beliefs. The second component, the subjective norm, is a function of a person's beliefs about what important referents think he or she should do, weighted by motivation to comply with them. Such referents may include significant others, a particular reference group, or society at large. In addition, several researchers (e.g., Fishbein 1967, Jaccard and Davidson 1975, Pomazal and Jaccard 1976, Schwartz and Tessler 1972) have suggested that the

subjective norm is determined not only by social normative beliefs (i.e., a person's beliefs of how others expect him or her to act), but also by personal normative beliefs, that is, personal moral standards concerning a behavior. Personal moral standards (e.g., Jones 1991) concerning a particular mode of conduct are established when a person internalizes expectations of others concerning this behavior. These determinants of the subjective norm can be termed "internalized subjective beliefs." When behavioral acts are guided by such internalized pressures, they are no longer dependent on their linkage with the reinforcements and punishments on which they were initially based (Jones and Gerard 1967). In the Fishbein and Ajzen model "attitude" and "subjective norm" are viewed as predictors, and the "behavioral intention," is the criterion. Furthermore, the two components are given empirical weights in a multiple regression equation proportional to their relative importance in the determination of behavioral intentions. Importantly, the model incorporates both cognitive and affective components because attitudes, by definition, include affective or evaluative considerations concerning ensuing acts (in our case—intentional acts of misbehavior). It is clear now how this approach may be useful in the analysis of OMB as well.

The OMB Conceptual System: Core Relationships

Figure 1 represents the overall OMB conceptual framework. The core relationships are based on the Fishbein and Ajzen model as adapted by Wiener (1982) to form a normative-instrumental framework of individual commitment, and by Wiener and Vardi (1990) to conceptually integrate organizational culture and individual motivation. However, unlike the original model, in the proposed OMB system, misbehavior is not always some function of the two predictor categories: instrumental and normative. Instead, depending on its type, OMB may be determined by either one of the two predictors, or simultaneously by both.

OMB Type S reflects intention to benefit the individual rather than the employing organization. It is determined primarily by "attitude" which, in turn, is a function of the sum of beliefs concerning the consequences of the misbehavior for the individual ("instrumental motivation" according to Wiener, 1982). The reason for this assertion is inherent in the definition of OMB Type S. Because such misbehavior intends to benefit the self, it stands to reason that it would be influenced by person's beliefs concerning the extent to which the misbehavior is likely to result in favorable

Figure 1   Individual and Organizational Determinants of OMB Types: An Instrumental-Normative Model

or unfavorable outcomes. For instance, the probability of misusing company resources is smaller if the person believes that punishment may readily result from such act, than when no punishment is anticipated. Thus, the motivational process underlying OMB Type S is primarily calculative-instrumental. Nevertheless, while this type of misconduct is a function of instrumental processes, one key constraint that can inhibit such behavior is the strength of the organization's cohesiveness (we provide further discussion of this issue in the propositions section).

OMB Type O, which by definition reflects intentions to benefit the employing organization rather than directly the individual, would be primarily determined by "subjective norms" that are a function of the totality of internalized normative beliefs concerning organizational expectations from members (see definitions and discussion of norms and values above). Thus, as a rule, Type O misbehaviors are anchored in ideology and values, and are carried out by individuals who strongly identify with their organization, its mission and its leadership, and who often are willing to sacrifice self-interests for such causes. Breaking the law to protect interests of the company while risking personal well-being, would be a case in point. While normative pressures determine this type OMB, one could also argue that certain instrumental factors serve as constraints (for example, when the perpetrators refrain from acting because they estimate high likelihood of being punished by external agencies). Of course, it is possible that an individual may break the law on behalf of the company for personal interests. But, as we stipulated above, this form of misbehavior should be classified as OMB Type S because the predominate motive is benefitting the self.

Unlike OMB Types S and O, OMB Type D is determined by either normative or instrumental processes, or by both simultaneously. OMB Type D reflects intentions to damage and hurt a particular organization or social unit. Underlying such intentions may be normative forces as in the case of damaging company property as a show of solidarity with striking union members. At the same time, this kind of behavior might be largely determined by instrumental factors: deriving personal satisfaction out of an act of revenge or of vandalism. This is why we contend that, in principle, both normative and instrumental forces may converge simultaneously to determine Type D misbehavior. In addition to the core relationships discussed above, Figure 1 presents the position in the model of individual and organizational factors that influence the formation of internalized organizational

expectations and instrumental motivation of members. Subsequent sections will discuss additional theoretical foundations, issues that pertain to determinants of OMB, and an analysis of consequences of OMB.

Input from Decision and Social Information Theories
Misbehavior in organizations involves both calculative decision making and the processing of social information. In order to integrate such psychological processes in the OMB framework, we adapt two additional mainstream OB contributions that articulate such processes. The two models are complementary in that they describe both calculative and normative forces.

The March and Simon Model. Since in our proposed framework one major determinant of misbehavior is rational calculations of utility of behavior to self, it is important to account for the considerations that go into such a decision making process. March and Simon's (1958) seminal book on organizations offers important insights (e.g., inducement-contribution tradeoffs) about causes of work-related behavior. According to their paradigm, individuals in organizations decide not only to join or leave, but also explicitly how to perform. Granted, those decisions are constrained by imperfect (bounded) rationality, yet individuals are, by and large, aware of both constraints and opportunities in their organizational environment. For instance, they use such information in their decisions to stay or leave. This rationale can be readily adapted to explain forms of misbehavior because individuals are aware (albeit imperfectly) of the opportunities, as well as the consequences of engaging in misconduct. Such knowledge, in turn, provides the sources of most instrumental or calculative considerations that, like in the case of "standard" behavior, may be limited. Thus, the paradigm provides an essential attribute of the major cognitive inputs contributing to the formation of individual interests that determine Type S misbehavior, and may contribute to OMB Type D as well.

The Salancik and Pfeffer Model. The second component determining misbehavior comprises internalized beliefs and expectations. Relevant questions that may arise are: How do members of a social unit acquire norms and values? How do members "know" when they act in defiance, and therefore when they engage in certain forms of organizational misbehavior? The Salancik and Pfeffer (1978) theory of social information may be particularly helpful. For them, the social context itself affects person's behavior by shaping his or her perceptions and beliefs about organizational situations. Yet, one can argue, sense-making cues,

transmitted through both formal and informal social interactions, pertain not only to desirable behavior, but also, and perhaps more dramatically, to misbehavior. Such cues may carry important symbolic and affective meanings, as well as instrumental ones. Thus, individual attitudes and beliefs that are formed from such perceived "socially constructed realities," may determine the intentions that lead to all three types of OMB.

Core Antecedents of OMB

Our definition of OMB, the proposed conceptual framework which emphasizes the distinction between normative and instrumental determinants of misbehavior, and the support from other OB paradigms, all suggest the specific antecedents that may affect the formation of the motivational components in the model. These components can be seen as intervening constructs, mediating the relationships between various antecedents, on one hand, and intentions and misbehaviors, on the other hand (see Figure 1). Generally speaking, the basic reasoning underlying the model is that antecedents contributing to the instrumental component would primarily influence Type S misbehavior, and antecedents contributing to the normative component would affect Type O misbehavior. Both forces, however, may influence OMB Type D. The purpose of this section is to identify core antecedents of OMB. Rather than providing a complete list, we selected a sample of determinants that may contribute most to the variance of the normative and instrumental components of the model, and consequently to OMB. Two major types of antecedents are proposed: individual-level and organizational-level. Specific arguments and more detailed description of selected antecedents are further developed in the propositions section.

Individual Factors

Individuals differ in their propensity to engage in the forms of misbehavior as conceptualized in the present model, both in terms of values and attitudes, and personality traits. The model focuses on five types of individual differences as follows:

Personality. Two personality variables in particular seem to affect both motivational components and, in turn, the intention to engage in OMB. The two variables can affect both the normative process of value internalization and the "calculations" involved in forming instrumental beliefs about personal interests. First is the level of moral development of an organization member (Kohlberg 1969). Trevino (1986) has already

demonstrated the usefulness of this factor in the context of unethical behavior among managers. Second is the degree of sociopathic predisposition, that is, the state characterized by disregard for social norms and obligations without the inhibiting experience of guilt. Of course, extreme degrees of sociopathic tendencies characterize only a marginal portion of any organization's workforce.

Person-organization Value Congruence. This antecedent refers to the degree to which personal values held by the individual are consistent with core organizational norms and values. The higher is such a congruence, the more likely is a member to identify with a referent social unit and be guided by its values and norms (Chatman 1989, Hall and Schneider 1972). Hence, it is reasonable to assume that this variable represents a strong contribution to the normative component of the model and, in turn, to OMB.

Generalized Value of Loyalty and Duty. This is a personal value acquired in the process of primary socialization. It represents a generalized sense of duty and obligation, namely, the belief by individuals that they have a moral obligation to exhibit loyalty in all significant social situations in which they are involved (Wiener 1982). Regardless of their other values, individuals who rank high on Generalized Loyalty and Duty would tend to identify with their organization and behave accordingly. Therefore, this variable also represents a strong contribution to the normative component of the model.

Personal Circumstances. When an individual faces a compelling need or deprivation—material or otherwise—he or she might be more inclined to engage in misbehavior that may help them resolve such needs (e.g., Merton 1938). Conversely, employees may be less inclined to misbehave when anticipating being at risk of losing membership. Thus, specific personal circumstances partially determine one's tendencies to engage in OMB, primarily by shaping instrumental beliefs about the value of the ensuing consequences of any given misbehavior.

Dissatisfaction of Personal Needs by the Organization. When individuals perceive being mistreated by their employing organizations, the valence of self-benefitting misbehavior may increase (e.g., Analoui and Kakabadse 1992, Greenberg 1990, Hollinger 1986, Mangioni and Quinn 1975). Indirectly, this factor may also influence the way organizational expectations are learned and internalized; it is less likely for a member

to be successfully socialized by and to identify with an organization when mistreatment of self and others is perceived. Thus, dissatisfaction of needs by an organization primarily affects the instrumental component of motivation to misbehave but it can, indirectly, contribute to the normative forces as well.

Organizational Factors

Organizations differ in terms of the contextual conditions, at both the task and organization levels, that may affect the propensity of an individual member to engage in work related misbehavior. Five types of such factors are listed below:

Built-in Opportunity. Certain work organizations and jobs involve operations for which control is inherently difficult, for example, home delivery, operating cash registers, professional or food services, operations where cash transactions cannot be directly monitored by receipts, and inventory counts. In fact, most jobs may consist of some built-in opportunity to misuse or take advantage of various organizational resources (such as office equipment). The degree to which such built-in opportunities exist may enter into the instrumental calculations concerning the benefits, consequences, and risks of capitalizing on such opportunities (e.g., Astor 1972).

Control Systems. Regardless of the inherent opportunity, control systems such as appraisal, reward and disciplinary systems, or special monitoring arrangements, in some organizations, are more effective at controlling behavior than in others. Both oppressive and lax controls may contribute to the emergence of OMB (cf. Hegarty and Sims 1979). Thus, control systems, especially those that represent both extremes, may have a direct impact on members' instrumental considerations whether to engage in or refrain from acts of misconduct.

Organizational Culture. Organizational culture is widely regarded as a construct denoting the extent to which members share core organizational values (e.g., Wiener 1988). Several writers (e.g., Kunda 1992) have demonstrated the power of culture as a tool "used" by certain dominant groups (top management, for example) purposely to shape other members' values. Others (e.g., Hatch 1993) have begun to develop a conception of cultural dynamism that looks at how elements of culture interact over time. Either way, "organizational culture" may constitute an important normative influence on the inclination of members to engage in acts of misbehavior. Trevino's (1986) model, for instance, di-

rectly relates the organizational culture variable to unethical decision behavior of managers.

Organizational Cohesiveness. Since in very cohesive social units the pressures to adhere to norms of conduct are especially high (e.g., Janis 1982), this factor may be similar to organizational culture in its effects on misbehavior. It may, indeed, be more powerful. Accordingly, we regard this organization characteristic as a significant antecedent that may strongly contribute to the normative component in the OMB model.

Organizational Goals. By definition, organizational goals are closely associated with organizational values and expectations and, therefore, are likely to exert influence on the normative motivational component in the model. Furthermore, organizational goals may directly instigate misbehavior, particularly when they are highly demanding and unrealistic [for example, NASA's Challenger disaster (Reimann and Wiener 1988a) and, more recently, the Hubble fiasco (Stein and Kanter 1993)].

In the next section we begin to develop formal propositions for predicting OMB. Of the above list of antecedents, the following variables will be further discussed and the rationale behind their selection will be explained: Person-organization value congruence, personal need satisfaction by the organization, level of individual moral development, and organizational cohesiveness.

Propositions

A large number of specific propositions can be generated concerning the main and interaction effects of various antecedents on OMB. However, in this section we chose to focus on three groups of propositions that appear to most parsimoniously tap the principal relationships posited in our framework. Also, these propositions may serve as examples for the rationale and way of thinking underlying other potential hypotheses. The three groups are: (a) The effect of person-organization value congruence (POVC) on the predisposition to engage in different types of OMB, both directly and in interaction with personal need satisfaction provided by the organization (PNS); (b) The effects of levels of personal moral development on the predisposition to engage in different types of OMB; and (c) The intention to engage in OMB as a function of organizational cohesiveness. The dependent variables in all propositions are stated in terms of the strength of individual predispositions (or intentions) to engage in OMB Types

S, O, and D, as articulated in the section "OMB as a variable" above. We use the predispositional rather than the behavioral measures here because they are, by definition, the immediate outcome of motivation. Moreover, for these hypotheses we do not expect any difference in predictions when applying either behavioral or intentional variables.

The basic rationale underlying the propositions is as follows: Normative pressures, when consistent with the interests of a referent social unit (i.e., an organization, or part of it), will enhance misbehavior on behalf of the unit (OMB Type O), and will suppress misbehaviors that either benefit the individual (OMB Type S) or are intended to inflict damage (OMB Type D). On the other hand, organizational actions and conditions that either frustrate instrumental interests of individual members, or lead them to believe that to engage in misconduct is self-benefitting, will tend to promote stronger predispositions towards OMB Type S and OMB Type D.

OMB as a Function of Person-Organization Value Congruence and Personal Need Satisfaction

Person-organization value congruence (POVC), considered an essential determinant of organizational behavior (e.g., Hall and Schneider 1972), serves as a crucial factor in predicting OMB. As an antecedent of behavior in the context of social organizations, POVC seems to be the most immediate and most potent determinant of the totality of normative pressures impinging on the individual. But POVC itself is a variable. Thus, for the purpose of developing testable hypotheses we assume three levels of congruence: *Identification*: personal values are highly consistent with those of the referent social unit; *Detachment*: personal values are unrelated or neutral vis à vis the referent social unit; and *Alienation*: personal values are in conflict with those of the referent social unit.

Another important antecedent variable we focus on is personal need satisfaction by the organization (PNS), postulating a dichotomy of low and high levels of satisfaction. While POVC denotes a normative antecedent, we consider this particular psychological antecedent to be a direct determinant of instrumental motivation that, in turn, influences the intention to misbehave.

First we present propositions about the expected main effects of the person-organization value congruence antecedent. These main effects are summarized in Table 1, and the predictions pertain to the anticipated strength or weakness of the intention or predisposition to engage in a particular type of misbehavior.

Table 1 The Expected Main Effects of Person-organization Value Congruence, Moral Development and Cohesiveness on the Predisposition to Engage in Three Types of OMB

Determinants of OMB		Types of OMB		
		Type S	Type O	Type D
Person-organization Value Congruence	Identification	Low	High	Low
	Detachment	High	Low	Low
	Alienation	High	Low	High
Moral Development	Preconventional	High	Low	High
	Conventional	Low	High	Low
	Principled	Low	Low	Low
Organization Cohesiveness	Low Cohesion	High	Low	High
	High Cohesion	Low	High	Low

PROPOSITION 1. *Main effect of POVC on OMB Type S. Stronger predisposition to engage in OMB Type S is expected under conditions of Detachment and Alienation, and weaker predisposition to engage in OMB Type S is expected for Identification.*

PROPOSITION 2. *Main effect of POVC on OMB Type O. Stronger predisposition to commit OMB Type O is expected under the Identification condition, and weaker predispositions are expected for Detachment and Alienation.*

PROPOSITION 3. *Main effect of POVC on OMB Type D. Stronger predisposition to engage in OMB Type D is associated with the Alienation condition, and weaker predispositions are expected under Identification and Detachment.*

The next set of propositions pertains to the prediction of the predisposition to engage in OMB as a function of the interaction of the two core antecedents: Person-organization value congruence (POVC) and personal need satisfaction by the organization (PNS). These variables, again, are designed to represent the normative and instrumental dimensions, respectively.

PROPOSITION 4. *Interaction effects on OMB Type S. The predisposition to commit OMB Type S would be the strongest for individuals who experience dissatisfaction of their needs under POVC conditions of Detachment and Alienation. Weaker predispositions to engage in OMB Type S are expected under all other conditions.*

PROPOSITION 5. *Interaction effects on OMB Type O. The predispositions to commit OMB Type O would be the*

Table 2   The Predisposition to Engage in Three Types of OMB as a Function of Person-organization Value Congruence and Personal Need Satisfaction by the Organization

Person-Organization Value Congruence (POVC)	Need Satisfaction by the Organization (PNS)	
	High	Low
Identification (Values—Congruent)	High OMB Type O	
Detachment (Values—Neutral)		High OMB Type S
Alienation (Values—Incongruent)		High OMB Type S OMB Type D

Note: Empty cells denote a low disposition to engage in any type of OMB.

strongest when individuals experience satisfaction of personal needs (*high PNS*) under the condition of Identification. In all other conditions the predispositions to engage in OMB Type O are expected to be weaker.

PROPOSITION 6.   *Interaction effects on OMB Type D. The predispositions to engage in Type D misbehavior would be the strongest when individuals experience dissatisfaction of personal needs (low PNS) under the condition of Alienation. Such predispositions would be weaker under all other conditions.*

Propositions 4–6 are exhibited in Table 2. The next group of propositions spell out the expected impact of moral development (as a personality factor) on the individual predisposition to engage in OMB.

Effects of Moral Development on OMB

Kohlberg (1969) classified stages of moral development into three consecutive levels which denote a progression from a lower to a higher order moral personality structure. In organizational settings individuals at the "Preconventional" level (Kohlberg's moral development stages 1 and 2) are basically obedient and instrumentally oriented towards their organizational obligations. But when faced with opportunities to misbehave they would be less hesitant to take advantage of such circumstances, especially when they do not foresee negative consequences for themselves. Organization members at the "Conventional" level of moral development (Kohlberg's stages 3 and 4), when making behavioral choices at work, are primarily guided by

their acceptance of local social and organizational expectations. Because they are more strongly influenced by their social environment, such persons tend to yield to conventional normative pressures. In turn, such normative pressures may lead "conventionals" to violate norms which they deem irrelevant. Individuals at the "Principled" level (stages 5 and 6) are guided solely by internalized and stable universal principles that govern their judgment of right and wrong. For them these principles are absolute and, therefore, nonnegotiable. Such persons, we believe, are not inclined to misbehave under any of the hypothesized conditions. Table 1 presents a summary of the specific predictions (Propositions 7–9).

PROPOSITION 7.   *Effect of moral development on OMB Type S. Individuals at the Preconventional level of moral development would tend to exhibit a stronger predisposition to engage in self benefitting misbehavior at work, than individuals at either the Conventional or Principled levels.*

PROPOSITION 8.   *Effect of moral development on OMB Type O. Individuals at the Conventional level of moral development would tend to exhibit stronger predisposition to engage in organization benefitting misbehavior, than individuals at either Preconventional or Principled levels.*

PROPOSITION 9.   *Effect of moral development on OMB Type D. Individuals at the Preconventional level of moral development would tend to exhibit stronger predisposition to engage in destructive misbehavior, than would individuals at either the Conventional or Principled levels.*

Effects of Organizational Cohesiveness on OMB

Cohesiveness is viewed here as the degree of attachment or attractiveness the members of a social unit (e.g., work organization) experience toward each other and toward the social unit itself. A cohesive social unit exerts strong pressures on members to learn, internalize, and adhere to its core values and norms of conduct. As a result, such pressures contribute to a relatively high degree of uniformity in actions, beliefs, and sentiments among the unit's members. Indeed, the higher the cohesiveness, the stronger the pressures toward both uniformity and conformity (Lott and Lott 1965). Cohesiveness, then, seems to constitute a significant determinant of the normative component of our model, with the expected effects on OMB as indicated in the following propositions and in Table 1.

PROPOSITION 10.   *Effect of organizational cohesiveness on OMB Type S. There will be a stronger predisposi-*

tion to engage in OMB Type S among members in low cohesiveness social units, than among members in high cohesiveness social units.

PROPOSITION 11. *Effect of organizational cohesiveness on OMB Type O. There will be a stronger predisposition to engage in OMB Type O among members in high cohesiveness social units, than among members in low cohesiveness social units.*

PROPOSITION 12. *Effect of organizational cohesiveness on OMB Type D. There will be a stronger predisposition to engage in OMB Type D among members in low cohesiveness social units, than among members in high cohesiveness social units.*

The effects of high organizational cohesiveness on OMB Type O, namely the pressures to completely identify with a social unit's goals, and therefore to engage in unconventional acts on its behalf, are consistent with Janis's (1982) analysis of the "groupthink" phenomenon. In his terms, the normative pressures toward uniformity exerted on members in highly cohesive groups inevitably lead to dysfunctional decision making processes. Such dynamics, we believe, may eventually result in willful, unethical choices, as well as destructive acts.

Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that the predisposition to engage in type O misbehavior will not necessarily be strong in all high-cohesiveness social units. The analyses of organizational value-systems by Reiman and Wiener (1988b) and Wiener (1988) suggest that organizations whose value systems are disproportionately weighted with "elitist" values (i.e., those expressing superiority and uniqueness of the organization), are more likely to cut ethical corners, and even engage in criminal acts, than organizations whose value systems are essentially "functional" (i.e., denote values of performance, quality, or service). Thus, we expect the predisposition to engage in OMB Type O to be particularly strong in high cohesiveness organizational units which espouse "elitist" value systems.

Conclusions and New Directions

This paper suggests an integrative framework within which organizational misbehavior can be conceptualized from a motivational perspective. Such notions have long been due, given the prevalence of this phenomenon in organizations, the growing awareness among managers and experts, the social and financial costs of misbehaviors such as theft, estimated at over $25 billion a year in the United States (Greenberg

1990), or substance abuse, and the relative paucity of systematic attention given to it by mainstream Organizational Behavior literature.

The present theoretical statement on OMB has several advantages. First, it brings the construct of Organizational MisBehavior to the main arena of work behavior thinking by anchoring it in widely accepted motivational principles. Second, the framework reemphasizes the role of values and normative processes in determining organizational behavior (and misbehavior). Third, the proposed model allows for research propositions that lend themselves to empirical investigation and strategic managerial implications. Fourth, the proposed typology of OMB enables integration of different categories of intentional misbehavior, such as against production, property, and people (Hollinger 1986) with unethical behavior (Trevino 1986), into a unified conceptual framework.

Undoubtedly, further theoretical work on the OMB phenomenon is needed to expand our understanding of both its scope and effects. The following are examples of directions for future conceptual work. First, depending on the particular type of OMB, a given act of misbehavior can be analyzed in terms of several dimensions such as: (a) origin (e.g., authorized/unauthorized), (b) sustainability (e.g., rewarded/penalized), (c) manifestation (e.g., overt/latent), (d) perpetrator (e.g., solitary/collective), and (e) intensity (e.g., severe/benign). These dimensions must be defined and refined. Second, OMB must be assessed in relation to other modes of work-related behavior, for example, in the context of performance appraisal systems (e.g., should employees receive feedback on misbehavior as well as on standard and exceptional performance?). Third, misbehavior must be better understood in terms of the choice of actual and potential targets (internal/external, other members, property, rules, symbols, etc.). For instance, how are such targets chosen and why. Fourth, more refinement is needed in order to integrate the underlying paradigms of individual choice and decision behavior (March and Simon 1958), and of social information processing (Salancik and Pfeffer 1978) with the proposed motivational theory of organizational misbehavior. For example, we need to know more how different types of members obtain and process relevant (personal, organizational, symbolic) information that eventually leads them to engage in the various forms of misbehavior or refrain from it. We certainly need to better understand the role of organizational cohesiveness as mitigating social information and decision processes in the context of OMB. Fifth, considerable effort must be expended on

identifying outcomes and consequences of organizational misbehavior and how they affect not only the perpetrators themselves, but also their social environment (e.g., superiors, peers, subordinates), both in short and long terms. The dynamic nature of OMB in temporal perspective (How do OMB patterns change over time? What do members learn about misbehavior?), for instance, can be explored by adapting frameworks of cultural dynamics (e.g., Hatch 1993) to account for misbehavior as well as "behavior." Finally, there is a need to more directly examine the role of acute or short-term emotional states (such as rage, mood, jealousy, hatred, vengeance) as antecedents of organizational misbehavior. While our framework emphasizes more generalized affect (values, need satisfaction) variables, it only begins to explore some of these effects, especially on the emergence of OMB Type D.

To us, OMB should become an integral part of organizational research and theory. There is no question that we must recognize the pervasive existence of misbehavior at work and use a creative approach to its research. The long-term disguised participant observation applied by Analoui and Kakabadse (1992), the anthropological design used by Mars (1982), the quasi experimental design used by Greenberg (1990), or Robinson and Bennett's (1993) recent effort to develop multidimensional scaling of workplace (destructive) deviance, may represent such ingenuity. Indeed, we believe, that once research designs that would overcome our apparent reluctance to study misbehavior are developed, they are bound to open fascinating avenues for investigation in organizations.

The fundamental implication of the OMB framework is that policy makers and researchers must better understand the compelling impact of instrumental and normative forces on the emergence of different forms of intentional misconduct in different kinds of organizational settings. Recognizing these differences is crucial for the design of more effective behavior control strategies. From that perspective, the exploration of organizational misbehavior promises a more insightful understanding of ways to manage the whole spectrum of behavior in organizations. We believe that the new typology and conceptual framework presented here offer an important step in that direction.

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