Thucydides
from The Pelopponessian War, XII
The
next summer Alcibiades sailed with twenty ships to Argos and seized the
suspected persons still left of the Lacedaemonian faction to the number of
three hundred, whom the Athenians forthwith lodged in the neighbouring
islands of their empire. The Athenians also made an expedition against the
isle of Melos with thirty ships of their own, six Chian, and two Lesbian
vessels, sixteen hundred heavy infantry, three hundred archers, and twenty
mounted archers from Athens, and about fifteen hundred heavy infantry from
the allies and the islanders. The Melians are a colony of Lacedaemon that
would not submit to the Athenians like the other islanders, and at first
remained neutral and took no part in the struggle, but afterwards upon the
Athenians using violence and plundering their territory, assumed an
attitude of open hostility. Cleomedes, son of Lycomedes, and Tisias, son
of Tisimachus, the generals, encamping in their territory with the above
armament, before doing any harm to their land, sent envoys to negotiate.
These the Melians did not bring before the people, but bade them state the
object of their mission to the magistrates and the few; upon which the
Athenian envoys spoke as follows: Athenians. Since the negotiations are
not to go on before the people, in order that we may not be able to speak
straight on without interruption, and deceive the ears of the multitude by
seductive arguments which would pass without refutation (for we know that
this is the meaning of our being brought before the few), what if you who
sit there were to pursue a method more cautious still? you do not like,
and settle that before going any farther. And first tell us if this
proposition of ours suits you The Melian commissioners answered:
MELIANS. To the fairness of quietly instructing each other as you propose there is nothing to object; but your military preparations are too far advanced to agree with what you say, as we see you are come to be judges in your own cause, and that all we can reasonably expect from this negotiation is war, if we prove to have right on our side and refuse to submit, and in the contrary case, slavery. ATHENIANS.
If you have met to reason about presentiments of the future, or for
anything else than to consult for the safety of your state upon the facts
that you see before you, we will give over; otherwise we will go on Melians.
It is natural and excusable for men in our position to turn more ways than
one both in thought and utterance. However, the question in this
conference is, as you say, the safety of our country; and the discussion,
if you please, can proceed in the way which you propose ATHENIANS.
For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with specious pretenses—either
of how we have a right to our empire because we overthrew the Mede, or are
now attacking you because of wrong that you have done us— and make a
long speech which would not be believed; and in return we hope that you,
instead of thinking to influence us by saying that you did not join the
Lacedaemonians, although their colonists, or that you have done us no
wrong, will aim at what is feasible, holding in view the real sentiments
of us both; since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes,
is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they
can and the weak suffer what they must Melians.
As we think, at any rate, it is expedient—we speak as we are obliged,
since you enjoin us to let right alone and talk only of interest- that you
should not destroy what is our common protection, the privilege of being
allowed in danger to invoke what is fair and right, and even to profit by
arguments not strictly valid if they can be got to as your fall would be a
signal for the heaviest vengeance and an example for the world to meditate
upon ATHENIANS.
The end of our empire, if end it should, does not frighten us: a rival
empire like Lacedaemon, even if Lacedaemon was our real antagonist, is not
so terrible to the vanquished as subjects who by themselves attack and
overpower their rulers. This, however, is a risk that we are content to
take. We will now proceed to show you that we are come here in the
interest of our empire, and that we shall say what we are now going to
say, for the preservation of your country; as we would fain exercise that
empire over you without trouble, and see you preserved for the good of us
both Melians. And how, pray, could it turn out as good for us to serve as for you to rule?
ATHENIANS.
Because you would have the advantage of submitting before suffering the
worst, and we should gain by not destroying you Melians.
So that you would not consent to our being neutral, friends instead of
enemies, but allies of neither side
ATHENIANS.
No; for your hostility cannot so much hurt us as your friendship will be
an argument to our subjects of our weakness, and your enmity of our power Melians. Is that your subjects’ idea of equity, to put those who have nothing to do with you in the same category with peoples that are most of them your own colonists, and some conquered rebels?
ATHENIANS.
As far as right goes they think one has as much of it as the other, and
that if any maintain their independence it is because they are strong, and
that if we do not molest them it is because we are afraid; so that besides
extending our empire we should gain in security by your subjection; the
fact that you are islanders and weaker than others rendering it all the
more important that you should not succeed in baffling the masters of the
sea Melians. But do you consider that there is no security in the policy which we indicate? For here again if you debar us from talking about justice and invite us to obey your interest, we also must explain ours, and try to persuade you, if the two happen to coincide. How can you avoid making enemies of all existing neutrals who shall look at case from it that one day or another you will attack them? And what is this but to make greater the enemies that you have already, and to force others to become so who would otherwise have never thought of it?
ATHENIANS.
Why, the fact is that continentals generally give us but little alarm; the
liberty which they enjoy will long prevent their taking precautions
against us; it is rather islanders like yourselves, outside our empire,
and subjects smarting under the yoke, who would be the most likely to take
a rash step and lead themselves and us into obvious danger Melians.
Well then, if you risk so much to retain your empire, and your subjects to
get rid of it, it were surely great baseness and cowardice in us who are
still free not to try everything that can be tried, before submitting to
your yoke ATHENIANS.
Not if you are well advised, the contest not being an equal one, with
honour as the prize and shame as the penalty, but a question of
self-preservation and of not resisting those who are far stronger than you
are Melians.
But we know that the fortune of war is sometimes more impartial than the
disproportion of numbers might lead one to suppose; to submit is to give
ourselves over to despair, while action still preserves for us a hope that
we may stand erect ATHENIANS.
Hope, danger’s comforter, may be indulged in by those who have abundant
resources, if not without loss at all events without ruin; but its nature
is to be extravagant, and those who go so far as to put their all upon the
venture see it in its true colours only when they are ruined; but so long
as the discovery would enable them to guard against it, it is never found
wanting. Let not this be the case with you, who are weak and hang on a
single turn of the scale; nor be like the vulgar, who, abandoning such
security as human means may still afford, when visible hopes fail them in
extremity, turn to invisible, to prophecies and oracles, and other such
inventions that delude men with hopes to their destruction Melians.
You may be sure that we are as well aware as you of the difficulty of
contending against your power and fortune, unless the terms be equal. But
we trust that the gods may grant us fortune as good as yours, since we are
just men fighting against unjust, and that what we want in power will be
made up by the alliance of the Lacedaemonians, who are bound, if only for
very shame, to come to the aid of their kindred. Our confidence,
therefore, after all is not so utterly irrational ATHENIANS.
When you speak of the favour of the gods, we may as fairly hope for that
as yourselves; neither our pretensions nor our conduct being in any way
contrary to what men believe of the gods, or practise among themselves. Of
the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their
nature they rule wherever they can. And it is not as if we were the first
to make this law, or to act upon it when made: we found it existing before
us, and shall leave it to exist for ever after us; all we do is to make
use of it, knowing that you and everybody else, having the same power as
we have, would do the same as we do. Thus, as far as the gods are
concerned, we have no fear and no reason to fear that we shall be at a
disadvantage But
when we come to your notion about the Lacedaemonians, which leads you to
believe that shame will make them help you, here we bless your simplicity
but do not envy your folly. The Lacedaemonians, when their own interests
or their country’s laws are in question, are the worthiest men alive; of
their conduct towards others much might be said, but no clearer idea of it
could be given than by shortly saying that of all the men we know they are
most conspicuous in considering what is agreeable honourable, and what is
expedient just. Such a way of thinking does not promise much for the
safety which you now unreasonably count upon Melians.
But it is for this very reason that we now trust to their respect for
expediency to prevent them from betraying the Melians, their colonists,
and thereby losing the confidence of their friends in Hellas and helping
their enemies ATHENIANS.
Then you do not adopt the view that expediency goes with security, while
justice and honour cannot be followed without danger; and danger the
Lacedaemonians generally court as little as possible Melians.
But we believe that they would be more likely to face even danger for our
sake, and with more confidence than for others, as our nearness to
Peloponnese makes it easier for them to act, and our common blood ensures
our fidelity ATHENIANS. Yes, but what an intending ally trusts to is not the goodwill of those who ask his aid, but a decided superiority of power for action; and the Lacedaemonians look to this even more than others. At least, such is their distrust of their home resources that it is only with numerous allies that they attack a neighbour; now is it likely that while we are masters of the sea they will cross over to an island?
MELIANS. But they would have others
to send. The Cretan Sea is a wide one, and it is more difficult for those
who command it to intercept others, than for those who wish to elude them
to do so safely. And should the Lacedaemonians miscarry in this, they
would fall upon your land, and upon those left of your allies whom
Brasidas did not reach; and instead of places which are not yours, you
will have to fight for your own country and your own confederacy ATHENIANS.
Some diversion of the kind you speak of you may one day experience, only
to learn, as others have done, that the Athenians never once yet withdrew
from a siege for fear of any. But we are struck by the fact that, after
saying you would consult for the safety of your country, in all this
discussion you have mentioned nothing which men might trust in and think
to be saved by. Your strongest arguments depend upon hope and the future,
and your actual resources are too scanty, as compared with those arrayed
against you, for you to come out victorious. You will therefore show great
blindness of judgment, unless, after allowing us to retire, you can find
some counsel more prudent than this. You will surely not be caught by that
idea of disgrace, which in dangers that are disgraceful, and at the same
time too plain to be mistaken, proves so fatal to mankind; since in too
many cases the very men that have their eyes perfectly open to what they
are rushing into, let the thing called disgrace, by the mere influence of
a seductive name, lead them on to a point at which they become so enslaved
by the phrase as in fact to fall willfully into hopeless disaster, and
incur disgrace more disgraceful as the companion of error, than when it
comes as the result of misfortune. This, if you are well advised, you will
guard against; and you will not think it dishonourable to submit to the
greatest city in Hellas, when it makes you the moderate offer of becoming
its tributary ally, without ceasing to enjoy the country that belongs to
you; nor when you have the choice given you between war and security, will
you be so blinded as to choose the worse. And it is certain that those who
do not yield to their equals, who keep terms with their superiors, and are
moderate towards their inferiors, on the whole succeed best. Think over
the matter, therefore, after our withdrawal, and reflect once and again
that it is for your country that you are consulting, that you have not
more than one, and that upon this one deliberation depends its prosperity
or ruin
The
Athenians now withdrew from the conference; and the Melians, left to
themselves, came to a decision corresponding with what they had maintained
in the discussion, and answered: “Our resolution, Athenians, is the same
as it was at first. We will not in a moment deprive of freedom a city that
has been inhabited these seven hundred years; but we put our trust in the
fortune by which the gods have preserved it until now, and in the help of
men, that is, of the Lacedaemonians; and so we will try and save
ourselves. Meanwhile we invite you to allow us to be friends to you and
foes to neither party, and to retire from our country after making such a
treaty as shall seem fit to us both.” Such was the answer of the Melians.
The Athenians now departing from the conference said: “Well, you alone,
as it seems to us, judging from these resolutions, regard what is future
as more certain than what is before your eyes, and what is out of sight,
in your eagerness, as already coming to pass; and as you have staked most
on, and trusted most in, the Lacedaemonians, your fortune, and your hopes,
so will you be most completely deceived.” The Athenian envoys now
returned to the army; and the Melians showing no signs of yielding, the
generals at once betook themselves to hostilities, and drew a line of
circumvallation round the Melians, dividing the work among the different
states. Subsequently the Athenians returned with most of their army,
leaving behind them a certain number of their own citizens and of the
allies to keep guard by land and sea. The force thus left stayed on and
besieged the place.
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