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       Machiavelli 10 How
      the Strength of All States Should Be Measured In
      examining the character of these principalities it is necessary to
      consider another point, namely, whether the prince has such position as to
      be able in case of need to maintain himself alone, or whether he has
      always need of the protection of others. The better to explain this I
      would say, that I consider those capable of maintaining themselves alone
      who can, through abundance of men or money, put together a sufficient
      army, and hold the field against any one who assails them; and I consider
      to have need of others, those who cannot take the field against their
      enemies, but are obliged to take refuge within their walls and stand on
      the defensive. We have already discussed the former case and will speak of
      it in future as occasion arises. In the second case there is nothing to be
      said except to encourage such a prince to provision and fortify his own
      town, and not to trouble about the surrounding country. And whoever has
      strongly fortified his town and, as regards the government of his
      subjects, has proceeded as we have already described and will further
      relate, will be attacked with great reluctance, for men are always averse
      to enterprises in which they foresee difficulties, and it can never appear
      easy to attack one who has his town stoutly defended and is not hated by
      the people. The
      cities of Germany are absolutely free, have little surrounding country,
      and obey the emperor when they choose, and they do not fear him or any
      other potentate that they have about them. They are fortified in such a
      manner that every one thinks that to reduce them would be tedious and
      difficult, for they all have the necessary moats and bastions, sufficient
      artillery, and always keep food, drink, and fuel for one year in the
      public storehouses. Beyond which, to keep the lower classes satisfied, and
      without loss to the commonwealth, they have always enough means to give
      them work for one year in these employments which form the nerve and life
      of the town, and in the industries by which the lower classes live.
      Military exercises are still held in high reputation, and many regulations
      are in force for maintaining them. A
      prince, therefore, who possesses a strong city and does not make himself
      hated, cannot be assaulted; and if he were to be so, the assailant would
      be obliged to retire shamefully; for so many things change, that it is
      almost impossible for any one to maintain a siege for a year with his
      armies idle. And to those who urge that the people, having their
      possessions outside and seeing them burnt, will not have patience, and the
      long siege and self-interest will make them forget their prince, I reply
      that a powerful and courageous prince will always overcome those
      difficulties by now raising the hopes of his subjects that the evils will
      not last long, now impressing them with fear of the enemy’s cruelty, now
      by dextrously assuring himself of those who appear too bold. Besides
      which, the enemy would naturally burn and ravage the country on first
      arriving and at the time when men’s minds are still hot and eager to
      defend themselves, and therefore the prince has still less to fear, for
      after some time, when people have cooled down, the damage is done, the
      evil has been suffered, and there is no remedy, so that they are the more
      ready to unite with their prince, as it appears that he is under an
      obligation to them, their houses having been burnt and their possessions
      ruined in his defense. It is the nature of men to be as much bound by the benefits that they confer as by those they receive. From which it follows that, everything considered, a prudent prince will not find it difficult to uphold the courage of his subjects both at the commencement and during a state of siege, if he possesses provisions and means to defend himself. 
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