Machiavelli 15
Of
the Things for Which Men, It
now remains to be seen what are the methods and rules for a prince as
regards his subjects and friends. And as I know that many have written of
this, I fear that my writing about it may be deemed presumptuous,
differing as I do, especially in this matter, from the opinions of others.
But my intention being to write something of use to those who understand,
it appears to me more proper to go to the real truth of the matter than to
its imagination; and many have imagined republics and principalities which
have never been seen or known to exist in reality; for how we live is so
far removed from how we ought to live, that he who abandons what is done
for what ought to be done, will rather learn to bring about his own ruin
than his preservation. A man who wishes to make a profession of goodness
in every thing must necessarily come to grief among so many who are not
good. Therefore it is necessary for a prince, who wishes to maintain
himself, to learn how not to be good, and to use this knowledge and not
use it, according to the necessity of the case. Leaving
on one side, then, those things which concern only an imaginary prince,
and speaking of those that are real, I state that all men, and especially
princes, who are placed at a greater height, are reputed for certain
qualities which bring them either praise or blame. Thus one is considered
liberal, another misero or
miserly (using a Tuscan term, seeing that avaro
with us still means one who is rapaciously acquisitive and misero
one who makes grudging use of his own); one a free giver, another
rapacious; one cruel, another merciful; one a breaker of his word, another
trustworthy; one effeminate and pusillanimous, another fierce and
high-spirited; one humane, another haughty; one lascivious, another
chaste; one frank, another astute; one hard, another easy; one serious,
another frivolous; one religious, another an unbeliever, and so on. I know
that every one will admit that it would be highly praiseworthy in a prince
to possess all the above-named qualities that are reputed good, but as
they cannot all be possessed or observed, human conditions not permitting
of it, it is necessary that he should be prudent enough to avoid the
scandal of those vices which would lose him the state, and guard himself
if possible against those which will not lose it him, but if not able to,
he can indulge them with less scruple. And yet he must not mind incurring
the scandal of those vices, without which it would be difficult to save
the state, for if one considers well, it will be found that some things
which seem virtue would, if followed, lead to one’s ruin, and some
others which appear vices result in one’s greater security and
well-being.
|