Machiavelli
The Prince
22
Of
the Secretaries of Princes The
choice of a prince’s ministers is a matter of no little importance; they
are either good or not according to the prudence of the prince. The first
impression that one gets of a ruler and of his brains is from seeing the
men that he has about him. When they are competent and faithful one can
always consider him wise, as he has been able to recognize their ability
and keep them faithful. But when they are the reverse, one can always form
an unfavourable opinion of him, because the first mistake that he makes is
in making this choice. There
was nobody who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the minister of Pandolfo
Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who did not consider Pandolfo to be a very
prudent man, having him for his minister. There are three different kinds
of brains, the one understands things unassisted, the other understands
things when shown by others, the third understands neither alone nor with
the explanations of others. The first kind is most excellent, the second
also excellent, but the third useless. It is therefore evident that if
Pandolfo was not of the first kind, he was at any rate of the second. For
every time the prince has the judgment to know the good and evil that
anyone does or says, even if he has no originality of intellect, yet he
can recognize the bad and good works of his minister and correct the one
and encourage the other; and the minister cannot hope to deceive him and
therefore remains good. For
a prince to be able to know a minister there is this method which never
fails. When you see the minister think more of himself than of you, and in
all his actions seek his own profit, such a man will never be a good
minister, and you can never rely on him; for whoever has in hand the state
of another must never think of himself but of the prince, and not mind
anything but what relates to him. And, on the other hand, the prince, in
order to retain his fidelity ought to think of his minister, honouring and
enriching him, doing him kindnesses, and conferring on him honours and
giving him responsible tasks, so that the great honours and riches
bestowed on him cause him not to desire other honours and riches, and the
offices he holds make him fearful of changes. When princes and their
ministers stand in this relation to each other, they can rely the one upon
the other; when it is otherwise, the result is always injurious either for
one or the other of them.
