9 Of
the Civic Principality
But we now
come to the case where a citizen becomes prince not through crime or
intolerable violence, but by the favour of his fellow-citizens, which may
be called a civic principality. To attain this position depends not
entirely on worth or entirely on fortune, but rather on cunning assisted
by fortune. One attains it by help of popular favour or by the favour of
the aristocracy. For in every city these two opposite parties are to be
found, arising from the desire of the populace to avoid the oppression of
the great, and the desire of the great to command and oppress the people.
And from these two opposing interests arises in the city one of the three
ill effects: either absolute government, liberty, or license. The former
is created either by the populace or the nobility, depending on the
relative opportunities of the two parties; for when the nobility see that
they are unable to resist the people they unite in exalting one of their
number and creating him prince, so as to be able to carry out their own
designs under the shadow of his authority. The populace, on the other
hand, when unable to resist the nobility, endeavour to exalt and create a
prince in order to be protected by his authority. He who becomes prince by
help of the nobility has greater difficulty in maintaining his power than
he who is raised by the populace, for he is surrounded by those who think
them themlves his equals, and is thus unable to direct or command as he
pleases. But one who is raised to leadership by popular favour finds
himself alone, and has no one, or very few, who are not ready to obey him.
Besides which, it is impossible to satisfy the nobility by fair dealing
and without inflicting injury on others, whereas it is very easy to
satisfy the mass of the people in this way. For the aim of the people is
more honest than that of the nobility, the latter desiring to oppress, and
the former merely to avoid oppression. It must also be added that the
prince can never insure himself against a hostile populace on account of
their number, but he can against the hostility of the great, as they are
but few. The worst that a prince has to expect from a hostile people is to
be abandoned, but from hostile nobles he has to fear not only desertion
but their active opposition, and as they are more far-seeing and more
cunning, they are always in time to save themselves and take sides with
the one who they expect will conquer. The prince is, moreover, obliged to
live always with the same people, but he can easily do without the same
nobility, being able to make and unmake them at any time, and improve
their position or deprive them of it as he pleases.
And to throw
further light on this part of my argument, I would say, that the nobles
are to be considered in two different manners; that is, they are either to
be ruled so as to make them entirely dependent on your fortunes, or else
not. Those that are thus bound to you and are not rapacious, must be
honoured and loved; those who stand aloof must be considered in two ways,
they either do this through pusillanimity and natural want of courage, and
in this case you ought to make use of them, and especially such as are of
good counsel, I so that they may honour you in prosperity and in adversity
you have not to fear them. But when they are not bound to you of set
purpose and for ambitious ends, it is a sign that they think more of
themselves than of you; and from such men the prince must guard himself
and look upon them as secret enemies, who will help to ruin him when in
adversity.
One,
however, who becomes prince by favour of the populace, must maintain its
friendship, which he will find easy, the people asking nothing but not to
be op pressed. But one who against the people’s wishes becomes prince by
favour of the nobles, should above all endeavour to gain the favour of the
people; this will be easy to him if he protects them. And as men, who
receive good from whom they expected evil, feel under a greater obligation
to their benefactor, so the populace will soon become even better disposed
towards him than if he had become prince through their favour. The prince
can win their favour in many ways, which vary according to circumstances,
for which no certain rule can be given, and will therefore be passed over.
I will only say, in conclusion, that it is necessary for a prince to
possess the friendship of the people; otherwise he has no resource in
times of adversity.
Nabis,
prince of the Spartans, sustained a siege by the whole of Greece and a
victorious Roman army, and defended his country against them and
maintained his own position. It sufficed when the danger arose for him to
make sure of a few, which would not have sufficed if the populace had been
hostile to him. And let no one oppose my opinion in this by quoting the
trite proverb, “He who builds on the people, builds on mud”; because
that is true when a private citizen relies upon the people and persuades
himself that they will liberate him if he is oppressed by enemies or by
the magistrates; in this case he might often find himself deceived, as
were in Rome the Gracchi and in Florence Messer Georgio Scali. But when it
is a prince who founds himself on this basis, one who can command and is a
man of courage, and does not get frightened in adversity, and does not
neglect other preparations, and one who by his own valour and measures
animates the mass of the people, he will not find himself deceived by
them, and he will find that he has laid his foundations well.
Usually
these principalities are in danger when the prince from the position of a
civil ruler changes to an absolute one, for these princes either command
themselves or by means of magistrates. In the latter case their position
is weaker and more dangerous, for they are at the mercy of those citizens
who are appointed magistrates, who can, especially in times of adversity,
with great facility deprive them of their position, either by acting
against them or by not obeying them. The prince is not in time, in such
dangers, to assume absolute authority, for the citizens and subjects who
are accustomed to take their orders from the magistrates are not ready in
these emergencies to obey his, and he will always in difficult times lack
men whom he can rely on. Such a prince cannot base himself on what he sees
in quiet times, when the citizens have need of the state; for then every
one is full of promises and each one is ready to die for him when death is
far off; but in adversity, when the state has need of citizens, then he
will find but few. And this experience is the more dangerous, in that it
can only be had once. Therefore a wise prince will seek means by which his
subjects will always and in every possible condition of things have need
of his government, and then they will always be faithful to him.
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